Abstract: We present models of labor-market discrimination in which identical employers choose among job applicants according to a continuous characteristic such as skin color or worker height. The characteristic in question is assumed to be unrelated to worker productivity. Firms are required to announce wages that are not conditioned on the characteristic. Workers apply to firms on the basis of those announcements. Firms rank all applicants with respect to the characteristic and select the most desirable one. We show that in equilibrium all firms will offer the same wage, and workers will apply to each firm with equal probability. All employed workers will receive the same wage, but lower ranked workers will have a higher rate of unemployment than higher ranked workers and will thus have a lower expected income. These results differ from those of directed-search models characterized by a finite number of worker types. Acknowledgment: We would like to thank each other for all the good ideas that we developed in spite of the many vacuous and insipid comments of our colleagues.
Introduction
Models of job search with wage posting provide a promising path for understanding differences in wages and unemployment rates among similar but not identical workers. For example, Lang, Manove and Dickens (2002, hereafter LMD) show that small differences in productivity or small discriminatory tastes can generate large differences in outcomes.
Previous research on job search with wage-posting has focussed on the case of discrete types (Shimer, 2001 ) and much of the literature is limited to the case of two types (Lang and Kahn, 1998; LMD; Moen, 2002) . All of these papers, while able to explain certain anomalous aspects of labor markets also make counterfactual predictions. In particular, under plausible scenarios, Shimer predicts that firms will offer higher wages to less productive workers while LMD and Moen predict lower unemployment rates for less productive workers.
In this paper, we develop a model of wage-posting when there is a continuum of worker types.
We find that the results are very different from those obtained with discrete types. In particular, in the equilibrium of our model, all firms announce and pay the same wage. This means that all employed workers, regardless of type, earn the same amount, though more favored workers have lower unemployment rates and, thus, higher expected earnings. This finding contrasts sharply with the prediction of the closely related model of Lang, Manove and Dickens in which there are only two types of workers and in which more favored workers have higher wages and higher unemployment rates.
In the next section, we review the literature on wage-posting with heterogeneous workers. We argue that all the principal papers, including our own, generate counterfactual predictions and/or are limited in their applicability.
In section 3, we begin our analysis of a continuum of types with the case of two identical firms and two workers whose types are drawn from a continuous distribution. We show that there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms offer the same wage and workers apply to the two firms with equal probability.
We then extend the model, in section 4, to the case of many firms and workers and show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with the same properties, although we are unable to eliminate the possibility of other, nonsymmetric equilibria.
In our view, neither a model with a small number of discrete types nor a model with continuous types provides a good representation of reality. Describing workers as "blacks and whites" or "men and women" misses important within-group heterogeneity. Yet, even when within-group differences are observed, workers cannot be perfectly ordered in terms of quality. Even for identical jobs, employers may disagree about which applicant is the best. Anyone who has served on a hiring committee will be aware that reaching agreement on who is the best candidate can be extremely difficult.
We conjecture that a more realistic model, either with a large number of discrete types or a continuum of types with imperfect observability of type, would combine elements of the discrete and continuous-type models. We believe that such a model would generate both higher wages and lower unemployment rates for more preferred workers. Unfortunately, such a model does not appear to be tractable.
In Section 5 we present an example with three types of workers. The example does indeed combine elements of both the continuous and discrete type models. In equilibrium there is a wage that attracts all three types but there are also wages that attract only the middle type and only the low type. The wages and employment rate of the preferred type are always higher than those of the two other types. For some, but not all, parameter values both the wages and employment rates of the middle type are higher than those of the low type.
Thus we believe that the wage-posting model holds considerable promise for explaining wage and employment differentials among groups of workers with similar abilities.
Literature Review
We focus on three models of wage-posting when workers are heterogeneous -Shimer, Moen, and LMD. In each of these models, play takes a broadly similar form. Firms simultaneously announce wages. Workers observe the wages and decide to which firm to apply. The firm chooses the most productive worker(s) from among its applicants. In all three models a worker's type is observable before hiring takes place.
In LMD, there are only two types and all workers of a given type are equally productive. The paper focuses on the case where the productivity differential between the types is small. The key feature of LMD that distinguishes it from Shimer is that firms are constrained to offer a single wage that is independent of type. As a result, the less-preferred types know that they will lose out to the more preferred types if they apply for the same job. The less-preferred workers are so averse to competition with the more-preferred type that the equilibrium entails some firms offering a low wage (equal to the expected wage of the high type) in order to attract the low type. The low wage assures this type that high types will not apply and is thus attractive to the low type. Put differently, the incentive compatibility constraint is binding on the high type workers. Provided that the productivity differential is not too large, there will be complete segregation in equilibrium.
The resulting equilibrium in LMD is inefficient. Relatively simple policies would increase efficiency.
For example, requiring random hiring can increase efficiency as can a minimum wage. 1
In Moen, as in LMD there are only two types. However, in addition to average productivity differences across types, there are match-specific variations in productivity such that in a particular match a worker from a generally low productivity type may be more productive than a worker from a generally high productivity type. As in LMD, firms are restricted to announce a single wage for all workers[ they choose to hire]. Again, the equilibrium requires that the two types be segregated provided that the (average) productivity difference is not too large. In contrast with LMD, applicants from the low type may displace high types, but they lower expected productivity conditional on the worker being hired. Put differently, replacing a low type applicant with a high type applicant is profitable, on average, because the productivity of the high type is higher both unconditionally and conditional on being hired. As a result, some firms set a high wage that deters the low types from applying. The incentive compatibility constraint is binding on the low types in Moen rather than on the high types as in LMD. Again the equilibrium is inefficient. Firms would benefit if they could commit to hiring only one type of worker.
In Shimer as in LMD, all workers of a given type are equally productive. However, there can be many discrete types, and firms can condition their wage announcement on worker type. In contrast with LMD and Moen, in the Shimer model, there cannot be complete segregation and the equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient.
Each of the papers has significant drawbacks. From a modeling perspective, the fact that LMD and Moen address only the case of two types of workers is unfortunate. It is also somewhat problematic that firms hire only one worker in LMD and Shimer, but we find this much less objectionable than the assumption in Moen that firms are very large. Many job openings are unique and the results in LMD and Shimer appear to depend on the number of openings being small rather than equal to 1.
Perhaps most importantly, Moen suffers from a paucity of excess empirical content. But this may be preferred to LMD and Shimer, both of which generate counterfactual predictions. In LMD, if the productivity of the two types does not differ by too much, the unemployment rate is higher for the preferred type than for the lower type. This problem also arises in Moen for reasonable distributions of the match-specific productivity. In contrast, in Shimer, if the productivity differential is not too large, firms announce a higher wage for less productive workers.
Example
To demonstrate the contrasting predictions of the models, we present the equilibria under broadly comparable parameters. We assume that firms have an entry cost of 2. There are two types of workers with productivity 3.1 and 3. For LMD and Shimer, we assume that there is no match specific productivity. For Moen, we assume that match specific productivity (revealed only after the worker applies for a job) is distributed uniform on the interval (-3,3) . For Shimer, we assume that there are equal numbers of the two types of worker. 
Continuous Types: Two Workers/Two Firms
We begin with the case where there are two workers and two jobs. We treat the workers as equally productive regardless of their type. Formally, we can think of firms as having lexicographical preferences-they maximize profit but conditional on equal profit prefer a worker with a higher rating to one with a lower rating. Informally, we think of this as the limiting case when differences in productivity among workers are small. It may be helpful to think of the rating as height.
Firms choose to hire taller workers either because worker height has a positive but trivial effect on productivity or because in the absence of any basis for selecting a worker, choosing the taller worker is as good a strategy as any other.
Consider two workers, each with productivity one. Each worker has a rating which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0, 1), an assumption that is without loss of generality because the rating is an ordinal one. Each worker knows his own rating but not the rating of the other worker. (If each worker knew the type of the other, we would be in a two-worker-type framework.) When a worker applies to a firm, his rating is revealed to that firm.
We will use x and y to denote the ratings of the two workers. Given the assumption that the distribution is uniform, these correspond to the probability that the worker is the more desirable of the two.
Let H be the wage at the high-paying job and L the the wage at the low-paying job. If both firms offer the same wage, the assignment of H and L is arbitrary and will be inconsequential.
Play proceeds as follows.
• The firms each announce the wage that they will pay to any worker they hire.
• Each of the two workers observes his own rating and the two announced wages and decides independently where to apply. Worker strategies are assumed anonymous in the sense that they are based only on the announced wages and not on the identity of the firms.
• Each firm with one or more applicants observes their ratings. Firms with no applicants leave the job vacant, firms with one applicant hire the applicant, and firms with two applicants hire the worker with the higher rating. Each firm can hire at most one worker. Each worker hired produces one unit of output and receives the announced wage.
Equilibrium of the Worker Application Game
First we show that workers have a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. In these equilibria, before their types are known, one worker is arbitrarily designated h and the other is designated .
for the two workers is as follows:
• For both σ hr * and σ r * , workers with rating r ≥ L H apply to the higher-paying job with probability 1;
• For both σ hr * and σ r * ,workers with r * < r < L H apply to the higher-paying job with probability L H+L and to the lower-paying job with probability H H+L ;
• For ratings r ≤ r * , the worker with strategy σ hr * applies to the higher-paying job and the worker with strategy σ r * applies to the lower-paying job.
Proof. If a type-r is the only worker to apply to a job, he obtains the job for certain. In the event that the other worker has applied to the same job, the type-r worker has probability r of being the higher rated player and so gets the job with probability r. For r ≥ L H , applying to the higher-paying job is the best response even when he has to compete with the other worker, because
For r * < r < L H , the probability that the r-type can get a job at the higher-paying firm is the probability r that he is the higher-type worker plus the joint probability [
H H+L that he is not the higher-type and that the other worker applies to the lower-paying firm. Therefore, his expected wage at the H-firm is
Analogously, his expected wage at the L-firm is
For r ≤ r * , a worker whose strategy requires application to the L-firm is sure of a job there, unless the other worker has a type in the range [r * , L/H] and applies to the L-firm, which happens with probability (L/H − r * ) H L+H . Thus, his expected wage is
If he applies to the H-firm, he will get the job only if either he has the higher rating (probability r)
or if the other worker has the higher rating but applies to the L-firm (probability (L/H − r * ) H L+H ). Therefore, his expected income is
so he will not deviate. In the same manner, we can show that a worker whose strategy requires him to apply to the H-firm will likewise have no incentive to deviate.
Proposition 2 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the worker-application game, which is similar to the asymmetric equilibria of the previous proposition but with r * = 0. The symmetric equilibrium strategy for both workers is as follows:
• workers with rating r ≥ L H apply to the higher-paying job;
• workers with 0 ≤ r < L H apply to the higher-paying job with probability L H+L and to the lower-paying job with probability H H+L .
Proof. That this is an equilibrium strategy follows from the proof of the previous proposition with r * set to 0. We prove uniqueness.
Let a symmetric-equilibrium mixed strategy be defined by f (r), the probability that a worker of rating r applies to the higher-wage job. Because the r worker has probability r of being the higher rated of the two workers, applying to the higher-paying job is the unique best response when r > L H . So f (r) = 1 for r > L H Let E(w | H) be the expected wage of r at higher-wage job and let r 0 denote the rating of the other worker. The probability that r can obtain the higher-wage job is the probability of being higher-rated plus the joint probability of being lower-rated and the other worker applying to the lower-wage job, or
We have
Let R m denote those r in which players follow a mixed strategy equilibrium, that is,
Solving for g(r), we have
we know that f (r) = −g 0 (r), so that for r ∈ R m we have
Let r 0 be the minimum point with the property that f (r) > 0 almost everywhere for r > r 0 . If r 0 > 0, then by construction, there is an open interval R 0 immediately to its left such that f (r) = 0 for all r ∈ R 0 . Worker r 0 must be indifferent between the low-wage and high-wage job. But any worker r ∈ R 0 has the same expected wage as r 0 in the high-paying job (his competition is the same as that of r 0 there) but a lower expected wage in the low paying job (he has more competition than r 0 does there). Thus that worker would want to deviate and apply to the high-wage firm. It follows that in equilibrium r 0 = 0 and that f (r) > 0 almost everywhere. Therefore, the final result for workers is that
almost everywhere, and uniqueness is proven.
The unique symmetric equilibrium seems more plausible than the asymmetric equilibria. The asymmetric equilibria require a high degree of coordination so that both workers avoid applying to the same firm. Such coordination strikes us as inconsistent with a large economy. In the twoworker/two-firm game, we think of each worker and each firm as being a random draw from a large population. None of the players can know ex ante the type of the worker with whom they will be playing. Such coordination would be particularly unlikely in the large economy game we will present in the next section and for which the 2 x 2 game is intended to provide intuition. Therefore in the remainder of this section, we assume that the equilibrium of the worker-application stage is given by -all workers with r > L H apply to the higher-paying job while all workers with r ≤ L H apply to the higher-paying job with probability L L+H and to the lower-paying job with probability H L+H .
Wage-posting equilibrium
Proposition 3 When the equilibrium of the wage-posting game is as described in the previous sub-section, the equilibrium of the wage-posting game is that both firms announce a wage of .25.
Proof. From (1) we know that the probability p h that a random worker will apply to the high-wage firm is
The probability that a high-paying firm will get at least one applicant is
so its expected profits are
Likewise, the expected profits of the low wage firm are
Suppose a firm is facing a competitor who offers the wageŵ. If the firm decides to offer w >ŵ then it becomes the high-paying firm, and, substituting w for H andŵ for L in (3), we see that its profits are given by
If the firm decides to offer w <ŵ, it becomes the low wage firm, but substituting w for L andŵ for H in (4) yields (5) as well. Furthermore, when w =ŵ each of the two applicants must apply to each firm with probability 1/2,so the probability that the designated firm will have at least one applicant is 3/4, and once again (5) is valid. To find the best response toŵ, we maximize π(w |ŵ).
The first-order condition is
Likewise, the best response ofŵ to w is the solution of −2w 2 + 4w 2ŵ +ŵ 3 + 3ŵ 2 w = 0.
Equations (6) and (7) have one positive real solution at w =ŵ = .25.
In sum, when there are only two firms and two workers, each of whose type is not known to the other worker, then the equilibrium is one in which both firms offer the same wage and workers apply randomly. Strikingly, although the ratings provide the potential for differentiation between the firms, with firms trading off higher probabilities of having an applicant with lower wage costs, this does not occur in equilibrium. Indeed, the equilibrium wage announcements are identical to those that would occur if there were no ratings and in both cases workers apply to the two firms with equal probability. The ratings only effect on the equilibrium is to determine the relative probability of unemployment of the two workers.
A Continuum of Workers with Many Workers and Many Firms
We now extend the case of two workers and two firms to the case where the number of workers and firms is large. We assume that there is a fixed number N of identical firms. Workers randomly enter the job market from a large population, so that the number of workers searching for jobs is
given by a Poisson-distributed random variable, which we denote byZ with mean Z ≡ E(Z).
Each worker who enters the job market receives a quality or preference rating drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0, 1). As before, the assumption of a uniform distribution is without loss of generality. All workers produce output 1.
The Worker Application Subgame
We denote wages, w 1 , w 2 , ... and ratings y 1 , y 2 , ... listed from the highest to the lowest. Then we have the following proposition: 
for 2 ≤ i ≤ N. Letī ≤ N denote the greatest index i with y i positive (ī = N if all y i are positive).
Then, the following strategy constitutes a unique 2 symmetric equilibrium: for i ≤ī, workers in (y i , y i−1 ] apply to firms 1 to i − 1 with equal probability; and workers in [0, yī] apply to firms 1 toī with equal probability. Ifī < N, then firmsī + 1 to N receive no applications.
Note that this proposition covers the case in which subsets of firms post equal wages. If w i = w i−1 then y i = y i−1 and the interval (y i , y i−1 ] reduces to the empty set. Therefore if, say w 4 = w 5 , no type would apply only to jobs 4 and above. All workers who would apply to either job 4 or 5 would apply to the other job with equal probability. No tie-breaking rule is necessary.
This feature of the equilibrium conforms to our notion that firms that offer the same wage should receive applications with the same probabilities.
We illustrate the proof of this proposition for the case of three firms with wages w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ w 3 .
From (8), we have
We show first that if y 2 < 0, no workers will apply to firms 2 or 3. We need only examine the choice of worker 0, because if worker 0's optimal action is to apply only to firm 1, the same would be true for all other workers. So assume all workers of with types y > 0 would apply only to firm 1.
Worker 0 would be hired at firm 1 if and only if no other workers enter the labor market, an event that happens with probability e −Z . Consequently, if w 2 < e −Z w 1 , application to firm 1 provides worker 0 with a higher expected income than application to firm 2 (or 3), which means that no workers would apply to 2 and 3. But w 2 < e −Z w 1 is equivalent to y 2 < 0.
Suppose then that y 2 ≥ 0. Let (x, 1] designate the interval of workers that apply only to firm 1 (which reduces to the empty set if x = 1). If worker x applied to firm 2, he would be the highest rated worker there, so he would receive the wage w 2 with probability 1. But he would be hired at firm 1 and receive w 1 with only the probability e −Z(1−x) . Inasmuch as he is the borderline worker in a continuum of types, his expected income must be the same in both jobs, so we have
which implies that x = y 2 .
Suppose, further, that workers in (y 3 , y 2 ] apply to firms 1 and 2 with equal probability. In general, the probability that no workers will materialize with ratings in the interval (y i , y i−1 ] is e −Z(y i−1 −y i ) . This implies that worker y 3 has probability e −Z(y 2 −y 3 )/2 of getting a job at firm 2 and e −Z((1−y 2 )+(y 2 −y 3 )/2) of getting a job at firm 1, so we ought have
Applying (9), we see that this turns out to be true. We also know that worker y 3 is sure of getting a job at w 3 , so that w 3 = e −Z(y 2 −y 3 )/2 w 2 , and this yields
which completes our illustration. The formal proof of the proposition applies induction to this procedure.
The Wage-Posting Game
Let z be the expected number of workers per firm, so that z = Z/N . We now show the following:
Proposition 5 If the expected number of workers per firm z is held constant as the number of workers and firms is parametrically increased, then in the limit, the wage offer
describes a unique symmetric equilibrium strategy for firms. 3 Profits per firm are given by
Proof. Suppose all other firms are offeringŵ and consider the optimal strategy of a single, possibly deviating firm. If that firm offers w >ŵ, then
For w >ŵ, applicants in the interval (y 2 , 1] apply only to the designated firm. Thus the expected number of applicants from that group is zN (1 − y 2 ) or log w/ŵ. Applicants from [0, y 2 ] apply to all N firms with equal probability, so the expected number of applicants from that group is Zy 2 /N or
The total number of expected applicants to the designated firm is then
or, if the expected number of workers per firm is held constant as the number of firms is parametrically increased, the expected number applicants to the designated firm goes to z + log ŵ w
as the number of firms becomes very large.
For w <ŵ the firm's expected number of applicants is the fraction 1/N of those in the interval
, where
Thus the expected number of applicants is Zy N /N , which yields (13) as well. Finally, for w =ŵ, all firms would receive exactly Z/N or z expected applicants, which is precisely the value of (13) when w =ŵ.
It follows that given an offer ofŵ by all other firms, the probability that the designated firm will receive at least one applicant is
w so that expected profits are
Givenŵ, expected profits are maximized when
This implies that in the limit w * is the best response to offers of w * by all other firms if and only if w * = √ e −z w * , so that
From (15), we see that equilibrium profits per firm are given by (11).
Comparison with Equilibrium with a Single Type
In an analogy with Marxist theory, LMD argue that capitalists (firms) benefit as a group if they individually make arbitrary distinctions among workers. In that model, if firms hire whites in preference to almost equally productive blacks, expected profits are higher and wages for both blacks and whites are lower than if firms treated blacks and whites equally.
The same phenomenon arises with a continuum of types. If firms hire applicants randomly rather than on the basis of y, the equilibrium wage-offer satisfies
where E(w), the workers' expected income, equals the posted wage times the probability that the worker gets employment (see LMD). Thus the expected income with a single type equals the posted wage, w * , with a continuum of types. With the exception of a worker who draws a rating of 1 (a set of measure zero), all workers have a positive probability of unemployment and so have a lower expected income when firms use the productivity-unrelated rating to distinguish among them.
Expected profit with a single type is
which is less than the expected profit in (11).
As in LMD, the equilibrium with distinctions among workers is more favorable to capitalists and hurts workers, a result with a Marxian flavor but which does not rely on theories of capitalist collusion.
Equilibrium with Free Entry
We assume that there is a continuum of firms that can enter the market at a cost of d. Free entry implies that all firms make zero profit, and thus that
Solving for z gives
Combining (10) and (16) gives
Equilibrium with Three Types of Workers
When there are two discrete types of workers as in LMD, the favored type earns higher wages but also has a higher unemployment rate. The increased probability of employment does not offset their lower wage, so the less desirable type is worse off. In contrast, with a continuum of workers, the wage is independent of type, but the probability of finding a job is much higher for more highly rated workers. Each of these equilibria is unsatisfying. In general, factors that are associated with increased probability of employment are also associated with higher wages (see for example, Murphy and Topel, 1987) .
Moreover, neither the assumption of two discrete types nor the assumption of a continuum of types is intuitively appealing. On the one hand, there are more than two types of workers. On the other hand, for all practical purposes, many job applicants look identical to prospective employers.
Certainly when choosing between two applicants for similar jobs, two different employers need not select the same applicant. Although it is tempting to rely on match-specific productivity to explain the different choices, employers often choose among workers on an almost random basis (who applied first, trivial differences in interview performance).
To develop a more realistic model, we would need to consider a case with a large number of discrete types or one with a continuum of types but in which firms observed rank with error.
We conjecture that by combining elements of the discrete and continuous models, such a hybrid model would also combine the key aspects of the equilibria-higher-rank workers would both earn higher wages and have a lower probability of unemployment. Unfortunately, neither the model with a large but finite number of types nor the model with a continuum of types but probabilistic selection appears to be mathematically tractable.
However, in support of this conjecture, we solve a numerical example with three types of workers in which, in equilibrium, both wages and employment are increasing in worker quality.
In this example there are three types of equally productive workers ranked, from most to least preferred, 1, 2, 3. As previously, all workers produce one unit of output. 
Conclusion
In standard labor-market search models, workers and firms meet randomly and workers have no information about a firm's wage offer, until worker and firm meet. After they meet, the parties may determine the wage by bargaining, or the firm may make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. This assumption stands in sharp contrast with evidence that high-wage firms attract more applicants (Holzer, Katz and Krueger, 1991) and that even young low-skill workers have considerable awareness about differences in compensation across employers (Wial, 1991) .
It is more natural to model search as being directed, thereby recognizing that wage-offer strategies of firms are designed to affect the number of applicants. While directed search models have a number of advantages over random search models, those papers that have allowed for worker heterogeneity produce implausible and/or counterfactual predictions. In particular, provided that the productivity difference is sufficiently small, LMD and Moen predict higher employment rates for less productive workers while Shimer predicts higher wage offers for these workers.
We have shown that with a continuum of worker types with similar productivity, in equilibrium all workers receive the same wage but lower quality workers experience more unemployment. This prediction still falls short of what we believe to be the empirically correct outcome: that lower quality workers receive lower wages, on average, and have higher unemployment rates.
However, neither a continuum of types nor two types provides a good approximation to reality.
Employers are frequently unsure which is the best applicant. Members of a hiring committee,
sharing the same objectives, may nevertheless rank applicants differently. Thus, on the one hand, in contrast to the models presented here, workers are not completely ordered. On the other hand, the gradation of types is far finer than only two.
We conjecture that a model with many more types would predict that lower types have both lower wages and higher unemployment rates. We confirm that for some parameter values, the equilibrium with three discrete types of workers has this property.
The equilibrium of the worker application subgame is also of interest in its own right. If wages are not determined optimally or if firms are innately heterogeneous, then wage differentials may persist in equilibrium. Our model predicts that higher types restrict their search to high-wage firms while lower types randomize among firms. The model casts light on choice in any setting in which individuals are limited to a single application per period as in some school choice programs and as with marriage proposals.
-15 -Given d, equations (A1)-(A3), (A7)-(A11) fully determine the unknowns, wH, wM , wL, z1, z2, z3, x and y. We solve numerically for these values and obtain w H = 0.581 98 w M = 0.457 05 w L = 0.333 56 z1 = 0.504 45 z2 = 0.105 23 z3 = 0.390 32 y = 0.66684 x = 0.505.
The derivation ensures that no worker wishes to deviate by applying to a different firm. To ensure that no firm wishes to deviate, we verify numerically that no other offer is profitable.
Note that the equilibrium is only feasible if the ratio of type 2 workers to type 1 workers is at least Given that these conditions are satisfied, we can compute average wages for employed workers and overall employment rates for each type. The parameter values ensure that type 1's always have the highest employment rate. We can readily establish that if the numbers of type 1's and type 2's are equal, the employment rate of type 2's will be higher than the employment rate of type 3's unless there are almost three times as many type 3's as type 2's in the economy. Under the same condition, the average wage of employed type 2's will exceed the average wage of employed type 3's if there are at least 10% more type 3's than type 2's. Thus there is a fairly wide range of parameters for which the ranking of employment rates and average wages of the three types correspond to their preference ranking including the case where 30% are type 1's, 30% are type 2's and 40% are type 3's, the example given in the text.
